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Abstract
If we defĳine tradition too hastily we leave to one side the question of what the rel-
evance of tradition is for us. Here the concept of tradition is opened up by consid-
ering the diffferent views of it taken by Hannah Arendt, Michael Oakeshott and 
Alasdair MacIntyre. We see that each has put tradition into a fully developed pic-
ture of what our predicament is in modernity; and that each has difffered in their 
assessment of what our relation to tradition is or should be. Arendt sees tradition 
as something which no longer conditions action, Oakeshott sees tradition as some-
thing which conditions all action, and MacIntyre sees tradition as something 
which should condition right action. In each case, the view of tradition is clearly 
one element in an attempt to see how the most important constituent elements of 
human existence – variously called the human condition, human conduct, or 
human virtue – should be understood in a modernity which is ours because it has 
put the traditional concept of tradition into question.
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I
This essay uses the writings of three twentieth-century philosophers who 
have written in English – Hannah Arendt, Michael Oakeshott and Alasdair 
MacIntyre – to show that the modern understanding of tradition cannot be 
limited to one defĳinition. There are, at least, two concepts of tradition, and 
three rival views of what our relation to tradition must be.
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The standard modern defĳinition of tradition, as it has emerged in the 
writings of sociologists, historians and philosophers in the last half century 
or so, is an abstract one. It is that tradition is simply anything that is trans-
ferred through time from generation to generation, is handed down in such 
a way that it is transformed (as well as transferred) by those who transfer it, 
and is handed down in such a way that not only the tradition itself, but 
those who transfer it, and any transformations made to it, are all legiti-
mated by being traditional. Or, as Shils puts it, it is “anything handed down 
from past to present”. It includes, he suggests, “material objects, beliefs 
about all sorts of things, images of persons and events, practices and insti-
tutions . . . buildings, monuments, landscapes, sculptures, paintings, books, 
tools, machines . . . all that a society of a given time possesses and which 
already existed when it present possessions came upon it”.1
The standard modern defĳinition is good as far as it goes. But we can put 
it in question if we observe that it difffers from the older (or traditional) 
meaning of tradition. The original term traditio, in Latin, which derived 
from the verb meaning ‘to hand over’, tradere, meant simply something 
which is handed over. Prickett, who has written about the history of the 
concept of tradition, writes that “there has actually been remarkably little 
change in the meaning of the word ‘tradition’ itself from the time when 
Tertullian and the Church Fathers took the Latin traditio, in its legal mean-
ing of ‘handing over’ or ‘delivery’, and wrote by analogy of the Traditio evan-
gelica – or Catholica.”2 It is true, as he says, that from this time tradition has 
always been the word for “the historical conveyance of received notions”,3 
but what we have to recognize is that this tradition was for most of its his-
tory a singular one. In Catholic Christianity there was one human tradition 
which handed over one divine truth. But in Protestant Christianity the tra-
dition (associated with the church) was, for the fĳirst time, separated from 
the truth (associated with the Bible): a separation of kerygma and traditio 
which broke the original unity; and which led to the recognition, at least by 
the end of the seventeenth century, that religions existed in the plural, and, 
later, that cultures and truths also existed in the plural. So, by the time Shils 
1) Edward Shils, Tradition (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981), 12.
2) Stephen Prickett, Modernity and the Reinvention of Tradition: Backing into the Future 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 28.
3) Ibid., 70.
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attempted to defĳine tradition, he was at the end of a long history of drift 
from a view of tradition which related it to truth to a view of tradition which 
related it to more or less anything.
The standard modern defĳinition of tradition, then, ignores truth. It is an 
abstraction. It does not relate to one truth but any ritual, symbol or situa-
tion, or, indeed, any truth – anything which conditions an activity. Tradi-
tion, understood this way, is plural, it is alterable and it is even inventable.4 
We can see why Popper commented sixty years ago that any “theory of tra-
dition” would have to be a “sociological theory” and why it is sociologists 
like Weber and Shils who are associated most strongly with theories of tra-
dition.5 The sociologist stands back from traditions, which are endless in 
number, and studies them. But this involves the sociologist in a fundamen-
tal contradiction. For if traditions are everywhere, and condition all activ-
ity, then the understanding of the sociologist, the set of rules by which he 
studies traditions, and even his defĳinition of tradition, themselves emerge 
from a tradition, of which his method of study is only an abridgement, or an 
abstraction. Oakeshott argued this way in 1947, saying that “rationalism” 
comes out of “tradition” and is therefore secondary to it: Popper attempted 
4) For plural see Shils above. For alterable see the famous observation that “the whole exist-
ing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered”, in T.S. Eliot, ‘Tradition and the Individual 
Talent’ from Selected Prose of T.S. Eliot ed. Frank Kermode (Faber, 1975), 37–49 at 38. For 
inventable see Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Inventing Traditions’, in The Invention of Tradition ed. Eric 
Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–14. Hob-
sbawm’s thesis is hard to take seriously: for either all tradition is invented, in which case the 
thesis tells us nothing distinctive about modern traditions; or the thesis does tell us some-
thing about modern traditions, in which case he fails to distinguish modern “invented” tra-
dition from older (uninvented) ones. See Prickett, 14–15. Shils thought the thesis “frivolous”. 
See Edwards Shils, A Fragment of a Sociological Autobiography: The History of My Pursuit of a 
Few Ideas ed. Stephen Grosby (London: Transaction, 2006), 130.
5) Weber thought tradition was on the “borderline” of “meaningfully orientated action”. His 
famous distinction of rational or legal, traditional and charismatic authority was ad hoc: 
although it enabled him to establish for sociologists the category of tradition by which 
authority rests “on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the 
legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority)”. 
See Max Weber, Wirtschaft and Gesellschaft, Part I, trans. Talcott Parsons and A.M. Henderson, 
The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (Oxford, 1947), 115–16, 130 & 328. Shils 
thought Weber was too concerned with authority, and had failed to see that tradition was 
ubiquitous. But Shils himself was more interested in “taxonomy” than “analysis”. See Prickett, 
Modernity, 14.
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to defend “rationalism” in 1948, by acknowledging that “rationalism” is a 
“tradition”, but by asserting nonetheless the primacy of “rationalism” 
according to a distinction between two types of tradition: “uncritical” or 
“fĳirst-order” traditions on the one hand and “critical” or “second-order” tra-
ditions on the other.6 The problem here was that this used “science” or “cri-
tique” – as sociology still often does – as a way of sidestepping the fact that 
tradition concerns us.
So not only do we have two concepts of tradition, one which relates it to 
one truth and another which relates it to any truth or practice. For if we ask 
what our relation to tradition is then there are three possibilities. Tradition 
is either nowhere, somewhere or everywhere. If it is everywhere it neces-
sarily calls rationality into question, since it is a general condition of all 
activity. If it is merely somewhere or nowhere, it does not necessarily call 
rationality into question, but then there is the question of whether it should 
be separated from rationality or reconciled with it. And each of the think-
ers explored one of these possibilities. Arendt thought tradition was 
nowhere, Oakeshott thought it was everywhere, and MacIntyre thought it 
was somewhere – and in each case they thought this had consequences for 
us. Tradition concerns truth or truths, or the absence of them: and as such 
all three took an understanding of tradition to be vital for an understanding 
of what they all called our “predicament”.7
This essay is written out of a sense that contrasting Arendt’s, Oakeshott’s 
and MacIntyre’s thought about tradition will not only establish a set of 
possibilities for what can be thought about tradition in modernity, but 
will separately clarify, through diffferentiation, the exact nature of certain 
element in each one’s thought. As far as I know, this is the fĳirst attempt 
to contrast their understandings of tradition.8 None of the three wrote 
6) Karl Popper, “Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition” (1948), Conjectures and Refuta-
tions: The Growth of Scientifĳic Knowledge 3rd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), 
120–35, at 122, 123 & 127. For Popper’s response to Oakeshott (“a really original thinker”) see 
121. Popper’s argument’s influenced Shils, whose view of tradition, ironically, is similar to 
Oakeshott’s. See Shils, Fragment, 128–33.
7) For “predicament” see Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (London: Penguin, 2006), 
6, Michael Oakeshott, “Introduction to Leviathan”, in Rationalism in Politics and Other 
Essays (Indianopolis: Liberty Press, 1991), 227, and Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study 
in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985), 263. 
8) For literature on Arendt, see Bhikhu Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New 
Political Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1981) and Hanna 
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narrowly on tradition: all wrote about tradition in the course of writing 
about something else. Here they are considered loosely in order of chronol-
ogy. Arendt’s The Human Condition was published in 1958 and her 
On Revolution in 1963, Oakeshott’s Rationalism in Politics was published in 
1962 and his On Human Conduct in 1975, and MacIntyre’s After Virtue was 
published in 1981 and his Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry in 1985. Each 
of them, in the course of these writings, articulates a real rather than nomi-
nal defĳinition of tradition: they want to say what tradition is as a res and not 
as mere nomina. Each relates tradition to action – although in importantly 
diffferent ways. And it should become evident that Arendt has the least 
favorable view of tradition, Oakeshott a more favorable, and MacIntyre the 
most favorable.
There is another reason why I consider them in this order. Stories are 
very important for all three: the means by which we venture into history, 
and place ourselves, and our endeavors, in time. And what they each say 
about stories is revealing about what they think of tradition. For Arendt a 
story comes out of action: the “end result” of “action and speech” will 
“always be a story.”9 So she emphasizes the beginning of a story. For Oake-
shott a story “does not open with the unconditional, “In the beginning . . .” 
but with a conditional “Once upon a time . . .”, and it does not come to a 
defĳinitive end, for “its end is the beginning of another story.” Stories have 
“no over-all meaning,” they are just “occurrences understood in terms of 
Fenichel Pitkin, The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt’s Concept of the Social (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1998). For Oakeshott, see Paul Franco, The Political Philosophy of 
Michael Oakeshott (New Haven: Yale, 1990), and Terry Nardin, The Philosophy of Michael 
Oakeshott (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001). For MacIntyre 
After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre eds. John Horton and 
Susan Mendus (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994). MacIntyre’s 
understanding of tradition has received much more separate attention than Arendt’s or 
Oakeshott’s. See, for instance, Emily Gill, “MacIntyre, Rationality and the Liberal tradition”, 
Polity 24 (1992): 433–57, J.B. Schneewind, “MacIntyre and the Indispensability of Tradition”, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991): 165–8, Jennifer Herdt, “Alasdair MacIn-
tyre’s ‘Rationality of Traditions’ and Tradition-Transcendental Standards of Justifĳication”, 
The Journal of Religion 78 (1998): 524–546, Thomas Hibbs, “MacIntyre, Aquinas and Politics”, 
The Review of Politics 66 (2004): 357–83. But see footnotes 12 and 52 below.
9) Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 2nd ed. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998), 
97 & 184.
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the meaning they acquire from their evidential contingent relationships.”10 
In other words, he emphasizes not the beginning or end of a story, but its 
middle. For MacIntyre a story is only intelligible if it has a defĳinite end. For 
even though any story is, as Arendt and Oakeshott agree, mired in unpre-
dictability, it always has, MacIntyre adds, “a certain teleological character”.11 
So he emphasizes the end of a story.
And what we will see is that, what is true of stories is true of tradition: 
Arendt is concerned with beginnings, Oakeshott with middles and 
MacIntyre with ends.
II
For anyone concerned with beginnings, tradition is a problem, because 
although tradition has a beginning, or an original “moment of truth”, it 
involves the perpetuation of that moment to later times, in such a way that 
it can interfere with or prevent later beginnings. This is the likely cause of 
Arendt’s extremely clear separation of tradition from the concepts which 
especially concerned her: freedom, politics, action.
Arendt not only separates tradition from action philosophically; she also 
sees them as separate historically. Her view of history is that it involves a 
rupture. She takes the view that what made tradition substantively tradi-
tional in older times was that it was singular, it was assumed, and it was 
constitutive of the order in which men and women lived. And this is, in the 
‘modern age’, no longer the case. We exist within the modernity which has 
been established by the decisive severing of history into two parts. Before 
the age of revolution, or the reforms carried out in the shadow of revolu-
tion, there was tradition; afterwards, there was not. And, as a consequence 
of this view of history, her view of tradition is not the abstract one of the 
standard modern defĳinition: on the contrary, tradition is historical, is sin-
gular, is determinate, is, or was, our tradition – and the problem for us is 
that it is gone, destroyed by revolution. It should become evident that for 
10) Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 105. Oakeshott here dis-
tinguishes a (third person) “story” from a (fĳirst person) “myth”, which is closer to what 
Arendt and MacIntyre suppose a story to be.
11) MacIntyre, After Virtue, 213. On unpredictability compare Arendt, Human Condition, 182, 
Oakeshott, On Human Conduct, 105.
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her this tradition is Roman in the fullest sense – the Traditio Catholica 
mentioned above.
This view is put most clearly in On Revolution, the essays collected as 
Between Past and Future and the early drafts of work which were posthu-
mously published as The Promise of Politics. Arendt never attempts to defĳine 
tradition, and this has perhaps encouraged some of her commentators to 
assume that the “tradition” is a philosophical one.12 Arendt always writes as 
if the “tradition” begins with Plato; but it is not a philosophical tradition but 
an anti-political one which soon transcends mere philosophy. According to 
Arendt, Plato responded to the execution of Socrates by withdrawing from 
the polis into the Academy, by declaring that politics was a means to a phil-
osophical life (vita contemplativa) not an end in itself (vita activa), and by 
distinguishing truth (which was singular) from opinion (which was plural).13 
This taken by itself was a “degradation of politics.”14 But Plato also intro-
duced into some of his political writings myths which supposed that some 
sort of authoritative good could be imposed on people by threatening them 
with rewards and punishments in an afterlife. This introduced an “element 
of violence” into politics.15 This is perhaps the origin of tradition, but – 
“before the Romans such a thing as tradition was unknown”.16
Tradition, for Arendt, was always one element of the “Roman trinity” of 
“religion, tradition, and authority”.17 It was, then, not an abstract “tradition” 
such as a sociologist could discover in any or all societies; on the contrary, 
it was the highly determinate tradition which had three stages – Greek, 
12) Most of the literature on Arendt deals with this philosophical “tradition” but overlooks 
the fact that it was part of a “Roman trinity”. See, for perhaps reluctant exceptions, Seyla 
Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 
1996), 91, Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 68–71, and Shiraz Dossa, The Public Realm 
and the Public Self: The Political Theory of Hannah Arendt (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1989), 154.
13) See Arendt, “Introduction into Politics”, in The Promise of Politics ed. Jerome Kohn (New 
York: Schocken, 2005), 130–35.
14) Arendt, “The Promise of Politics”, in The Promise of Politics, 83.
15) Arendt, “What is Authority?” in Between Past and Future, 132–5. Compare Simone Weil, 
Intimations of Christianity Among the Ancient Greeks trans. Elisabeth Chase Giessbuhler 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).
16) Arendt, Between Past and Future, 25.
17) For this phrase, see Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 1990), 117, Arendt, 
Between Past and Future, 124, and Arendt, “The Promise of Politics”, 50.
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Roman, Christian. Plato separated philosophy and politics: but it was with 
the foundation of Rome, the “Eternal City”, and the adoption of Greek 
categories by the Romans, that there was the uniting of authority, religion 
and tradition beneath one Emperor; and it was through the foundation of a 
Christian Church in Rome that the same authority, tradition and religion 
were bound together beneath one God.18
[Tradition] preserved the past by handing down from one generation to the 
next the testimony of the ancestors, who fĳirst had witnessed and created 
the sacred founding and then augmented it by their authority throughout the 
centuries. As long as this tradition was uninterrupted, authority was inviolate; 
and to act without authority and tradition, without accepted, time-honored, 
standards and models, without the help of the wisdom of the founding fathers, 
was inconceivable.19
Arendt’s view of history was that the end of this religion, tradition, and 
authority meant that other elements of human possibility which had been 
forgotten by the tradition were liberated. The “tradition” had forgotten “the 
experience of action as starting a new enterprise in pre-polis Greece, the 
experience of foundation in Rome, and the Christian experience of acting 
and forgiving as linked”.20 It was not until the American and French revolu-
tions that there was suddenly “the notion that the course of history sud-
denly begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or told 
before is about to unfold”.21 She explains her view of modern history in 
terms of the “pathos of novelty” in On Revolution.22 But it is in The Human 
Condition that she offfers a theoretical account of what she supposes should 
exist in a world without tradition. This is “action”.
Arendt never fully characterizes action. It is “one of the most important 
categories of Arendt’s political philosophy, yet the least clearly defĳined”.23 
Sometimes she suggests it is words and deeds, and sometimes that it is 
only words. For others it might be social, or cultural, or ethical: but for 
18) For elements of this story see Arendt, “The Promise of Politics”, 49, 50 & 60, and Between 
Past and Future, 17 & 25.
19) Arendt, “What is Authority?”, in Between Past and Future, 124.
20) Arendt, “The Promise of Politics”, 60.
21) Arendt, On Revolution, 28.
22) For this phrase see ibid., 34.
23) Parekh, Hannah Arendt, 113.
28 J. Alexander / Journal of the Philosophy of History 6 (2012) 20–43
her it is political. “The central political activity”, she declares, “is action.”24 
The most important thing about this “action” is that cannot involve vio-
lence, force or hierarchy, as it has to fulfĳill the conditions of equality and 
plurality.25 And it is not to much to say that in Arendt’s conceptual vocabu-
lary action is politics is freedom. “Men are free”, she says, “as long as they 
act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same.”26
She writes of the
actual content of political life – of the joy and gratifĳication that arise out of our 
being in company with our peers, out of acting together and appearing in pub-
lic, and of inserting ourselves into the world by world and deed, thus acquiring 
and securing out personal identity and beginning something entirely new.27
It is a world in which
. . . men in their freedom can interact with one another without compulsion, 
force, and rule over one another, as equals among equals, commanding and 
obeying one another only in emergencies – that is, in times of war – but other-
wise managing all their afffairs by speaking and persuading one another.28
Although she does not say so explicitly, this action is always momentary, 
of the moment. It is not conditioned by time, but is an emerging of the 
timeless into time. The theme of “beginning something entirely new” is 
important here. Her favorite quotation is Augustine’s line Initium ut esset 
homo creatus est ante quem nullus fuit (“That a beginning might be made, 
man was created before whom nobody was”).29 Action, she says, is a realm 
of “natality” because in “action” there is always the possibility of the “new 
beginning inherent in birth”, or the “capacity of beginning something 
anew;” indeed, all “action” is a beginning. This is a metaphor: but she 
24) Hannah Arendt quoted by Margaret Canovan, The Human Condition, ix.
25) See Arendt, Human Condition, 26 & 215. Compare Arendt, “Introduction Into Politics”, 95.
26) Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom?’, in Between Past and Future, 151.
27) Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics”, in Between Past and Future, 258–9.
28) Arendt, “Introduction Into Politics”, 117.
29) For her habit of quoting this line (from Augustine, City of God, 12.20), see Arendt, The 
Human Condition, 177, “What is Freedom?” in Between Past and Future, 166, “The Promise of 
Politics”, 59, On Revolution, 211, and even her last work The Life of the Mind (New York: Har-
court, Brace and Co., 1978), 217.
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considers it might be the most apt one. “Natality, and not mortality, may 
be the central category of political, as distinguished from metaphysical, 
thought.”30
It is the necessary condition of our being able to act freely, then, that we 
are not subject to tradition. The truth in Arendt is not a singular one which 
needs to be handed over as the truth of Christ is handed over by the Church: 
it is a plurality of truths, our truths, which we discover in interaction with 
each other.31 Arendt’s ideal is thus nothing more than the opposite of what 
is associated with “tradition”. If tradition is associated with unity, coercion 
and truth, then action is associated with plurality, equality and – some-
thing less singular and coercive than truth – speech. If she had ever used 
the word “tradition” in an abstract, universal sense, for any tradition, then 
she would doubtless have emphasized only the beginnings of these tradi-
tions.
The reason I say this is that the shadows cast by the ruins of tradition 
over modern history and philosophy are a great preoccupation in her writ-
ings. Action is such a continual momentariness that it is threatened by any 
tendency to establish order through time – in law, morality or custom. She 
knows that “action” is subject to “the threefold frustration” of “the unpre-
dictability of outcomes, the irreversibility of the process, and the anonym-
ity of its authors”.32 In The Human Condition she sketches a few abstract 
means by which action could survive its introduction into history: “prom-
ise” so that action does not simply dissolve in the moment, but survives 
into the future, and “forgiveness” so that action will never become fĳixed in 
such a way as to prevent further action.33 But in On Revolution, where she 
writes historically, she is more mordant about the fate of the revolutionary 
attempt to separate action from tradition. It failed. The revolutionaries 
attempted to “fĳind a new secular absolute to replace the old religious 
absolute”.34 And – according to the usual paradox of tradition – they 
30) Arendt, Human Condition, 9.
31) Arendt disliked singular “truth” because it contained an “element of coercion”. But she 
wanted to avoid relativism. See Arendt, “Truth and Politics”, in Between Past and Future, 235, 
and John S. Nelson, “Politics and Truth: Arendt’s Problematic”, American Journal of Political 
Science 22 (1978): 270–301.
32) Arendt, Human Condition, 220.
33) Ibid., 237.
34) Arendt, On Revolution, 39. Cf. 116, 184–5 & 191. See also Arendt, “What is Authority?”, in 
Between Past and Future, 134.
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soon shifted from revolting against tradition to forming a “revolutionary 
tradition”. This tradition, she claims, was based on “opposites – the right 
and the left, reactionary and progressive, conservatism and liberalism” – 
which were “two sides of the same event” but which after the revolution 
“parted company, solidifĳied into ideologies, and began to oppose each 
other”.35 The rise of party politics perpetuated the failure of revolution: for 
instead of “action” there was only “representation” – the French sociétés 
populaires, American ‘republics’ and Bolshevik soviets were all forgotten – 
and that “the spirit of revolution – a new spirit and the spirit of beginning 
something new – failed to fĳind its appropriate institution.”36
Arendt’s is a powerful view of tradition – “our tradition” – which attempts 
to theorize history in terms of “the actor or agent” and not in terms of “the 
spectator who watches a spectacle.”37 She sees tradition as a determinate 
and unitary tradition, which is lost to us, because we no longer believe in its 
truth; but which has a legacy that causes endless difffĳiculties in our appar-
ently post-traditional society. Arendt did not use the term “post-traditional” 
but she could well have done. We could say that her writings are the 
clearest attempt in modernity to see what life in a post-traditional society 
could entail. If that is one way of putting it, the other is to say, as Parekh 
says, that Arendt “is unable to appreciate the importance of traditions 
in political life.”38
No one would ever have said that of Oakeshott.
III
For anyone concerned with middles, tradition is simply the condition of all 
action. When one is in the middle of something, one is not concerned only 
with situation, not origin or destination. Oakeshott, I have said, is con-
cerned with middles. His theory is the same as Shils’s: that, in a sense, 
everything we do is traditional. He, too, emphasizes practices rather than 
truth. But he, like Arendt, theorizes it in relation to action, although not at 
all as she does.
35) Arendt, On Revolution, 223.
36) Ibid., 280.
37) Ibid., 52.
38) Parekh, Hannah Arendt, 179.
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Oakeshott does not separate action and tradition as Arendt does; but, 
rather, understands action as something necessarily enveloped in tradi-
tion. Here I will mainly consider his late work On Human Conduct which, 
interestingly, does not use the word “tradition” but uses the word “practice” 
instead. However, Oakeshott’s thought was laced with tradition: explicitly 
so, famously, in the essays collected as Rationalism in Politics – and, as we 
shall see, there is no reason to think he changed his mind about the impor-
tance of tradition. There is no doubt that Oakeshott wrote at a higher level 
of abstraction than Arendt and MacIntyre. He wrote about tradition at a 
philosophical level, whereas Arendt and MacIntyre did not. But it is impor-
tant to note that Arendt and MacIntyre could not write philosophically, 
since they were concerned with actual, rather than abstract, traditions. 
And, as I have already suggested, one of the great ambiguities of tradition is 
that the more abstract the concept of tradition is taken to be the more it 
comes to lack what makes a tradition a tradition – which is its actuality.
In On Human Conduct Oakeshott begins, as Arendt does, with action.39 
His characterization of action is similar to Arendt’s and may even have 
been indebted to it.40 Oakeshott puts “actions and utterances” together as 
Arendt put “words and deeds” together. “A man may perform an action, he 
make undertake a course of action, and he may make utterances which are 
themselves actions or are auxiliaries to actions.”41 But Oakeshott is skepti-
cal of attempts – whether psychological or sociological – to explain action. 
“A belief is what it means to the believer.”42 And so he characterizes action 
in the most abstract sense possible. It is a “human being responding to 
his contingent situation by doing or saying this rather than that in relation 
to an imagined and wished-for outcomes and in relation, also, to some 
understood conditions.”43 There are two elements here: anyone who acts 
has an understanding of his “wants” and an understanding of his “world.” 
And Oakeshott attempts to sketch some of the consequences of this: action 
seeks satisfactions, and responses; it is, as Arendt suggested, unpredictable; 
it involves deliberation between alternative actions; and it involves 
39) Oakeshott discusses action in Human Conduct, 31 fff.
40) See, for instance, the suggestion that the outcome of an action is “always a new situation 
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persuasion as its characteristic form of speech.44 But, most importantly, 
since action depends on understanding, and, indeed, is “an illustrative 
exhibition of this understanding”, it is something which has to be “learned”.45
Actions are “ad hoc,” “terminable,” mere “transactions,” but as they 
depend not only on an understanding of wants but also on an understand-
ing of the world they presuppose more durable conditions which he calls, 
in On Human Conduct, “practices”.46 A practice is “a set of considerations, 
manners, uses, observances, customs, standards, canons, maxims, princi-
ples, rules and offfĳices specifying useful procedures or denoting obligation 
or duties which relate to human actions and utterances.”47 In other words, 
practices are not actions, but the conditions of actions. They are “recogniz-
able” when they “acquire a certain degree of defĳinition and authority or 
acknowledged utility.” They are the outcome of former actions: they can be 
neglected, suppressed or abolished, and that they can be afffected now or 
in the future by the actions they qualify.48 All conduct – that is, action or 
utterance – takes place in terms of a “multiplicity of practices”. And in 
his theory Oakeshott sketches a hierarchy of “a multiplicity of arts and 
practices presided over by a practice of moral conduct and perhaps a 
religious faith”.49
In this way Oakeshott efffectively demotes action from its Arendtian 
height. We are related, then, not through actions, but through practices, 
that is, through the conditions to which we subscribe when we act. We are 
not at the beginning: we are in the middle. These practices are substantial, 
and they culminate in morality (“the practice of all practices”) and religion 
(also a “practice”).50 Oakeshott, who writes philosophically, is not con-
cerned with the absolute status of religion (or tradition or authority) but 
with the relative status of practices to human conduct. He does not assume 
that religion exists or does not exist, but treats it as something which may 
exist. So he discusses religion; and, later, he discusses authority – but always 
44) Ibid., 40–46.
45) Ibid., 32.




50) For morality see ibid., 60–81 and for religion, 81–86.
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in the abstract (any authority, any religion).51 He does not use the word 
“tradition”. But it is now a matter of common knowledge that in On Human 
Conduct Oakeshott uses the word “practice” where he formerly used 
“tradition.”52
Oakeshott does not use the word “tradition” because it is “inadequate to 
express what [he] want[s] to express.”53 He avoids it not because it is inad-
equate in itself, but because he wants to avoid being misunderstood as a 
Burkean in either sense: in the sense of simply defending a particular ancien 
regime, as Burke did, or in the sense of defending any ancien regime, as a 
Burkean might.54 The advantage of the word “practice” is that it enables 
him to avoid the risk of appearing to defend any substantive tradition. In 
his earlier writings he uses “tradition” in an abstracted sense, to stand for 
the abstract features possessed by any tradition, which he considers are as 
open to change as MacIntyre thinks they are; but in On Human Conduct he 
uses the word “practice” to make misunderstanding impossible. Traditions, 
or “practices”, are contingent, ambiguous and miscellaneous: they supply 
the conditions in which crisis is experienced and the answers out of which 
salvation can be sought.
Since Oakeshott nowhere adopts what could be called an absolute, or 
dogmatic, conception of tradition (in terms of “truth”), his earlier concep-
tion of a tradition, an abstract and relative conception, is indistinguishable 
51) Ibid., 149–154. 
52) In Oakeshott’s fĳirst book, Experience and Its Modes, “practice” is simply all practical 
experience, all actions with purposes in mind. But this is diffferent from what he later means 
by a set of understood conventions: he calls this fĳirst “tradition”, and later (after 1958) “prac-
tice”. This has been well recognized by Franco, The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott, 
132–3 & 170–71, Robert Devigne, Recasting Conservatism: Oakeshott, Strauss, and the Response 
to Postmodernism (London: Yale University Press, 1994), 17, Nardin, The Philosophy of Michael 
Oakeshott, 76, and Luke O’Sullivan, Oakeshott on History (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003), 
112 & 176–77. There is an entire chapter on this in Kenneth B. MacIntyre, The Limits of Politi-
cal Philosophy: Oakeshott’s Philosophy of Civil Association (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2004), 
41–76.
53) Michael Oakeshott, “On Misunderstanding Human Conduct”, Political Theory 4 (1976): 
364. The only time he mentions “tradition” in On Human Conduct is in the form “traditio” 
when he writes about religion. See 81.
54) For a view of Oakeshott as Burkean see Pitkin, “The Roots of Conservatism”, 249, 254 & 
256. For a counter see Franco, The Political Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott, 7, 108 & 136–40. 
Oakeshott was always concerned to counter such misunderstandings. See Oakeshott, “On 
Misunderstanding Human Conduct”, 353–67.
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not only from what he later meant by a practice, but is also indistinguish-
able from what sociologists like Shils have offfered as a characterization of a 
tradition in the abstract.55 An action is what it is: what is important is the 
context for action, which is a practice, or a tradition. It is in this way – and 
this is where there is a contrast with Arendt – that Oakeshott relates action 
and tradition. And it is, incidentally, as decisive for his view of politics as 
Arendt’s view of action was for hers.
Oakeshott suggests that politics is not prior to an established order but 
subsequent to it, and that this established order is best understood in terms 
of tradition. Since politics is “the activity of attending to the general arrange-
ments of a set of people whom chance or choice have brought together,” it 
follows that the arrangements and the activity of attending to them are an 
“inheritance.”56 They are not “action” in the sense of new beginnings, but 
“action” as conditioned by “tradition”. So the proper study of politics is not 
an “ideological” one in which a “system of ideas” is “abstracted” from a tra-
dition but is a “traditional” one – “an exploration of a tradition, an initiation 
into an inheritance, an observation and imitation of . . . our elders.”57
Oakeshott’s restoration of a relation between “action” and “tradition” 
suggests a very diffferent conception of politics to that of Arendt. Whereas 
Arendt excludes all hierarchy, and therefore all rule and government, from 
her conception of politics, Oakeshott considers politics a response to such 
rule. Politics is the “engagement of considering the desirability of the con-
ditions of conduct prescribed in respublica, of imagining and wanting them 
to be in some respect diffferent from what they, and of recommending and 
promoting a change from what is to imagined and allegedly more desirable 
condition.”58 This, again, is a conception of politics in terms of tradition. 
There is no ideal politics to be achieved in a revolution which breaks 
through all religion, tradition and authority: on the contrary, politics is not 
only an activity conditioned by “practices” but is itself the consideration of 
55) Cf. “Actions are not handed down; only their models, rule and legitimations are.” Edward 
Shils, “Tradition”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 13, no. 3 (1971): 127. See also 
Shils, Tradition, 31, and, for that matter, J.G.A. Pocock, “Time, Institutions and Action: An 
Essay on Traditions and their Understanding”, Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Politi-
cal Theory and History (New York: Athenaeum, 1971), 233–72.
56) Oakeshott, “Political Education”, in Rationalism and Politics and Other Essays (India-
napolis: Liberty, 1991), 43–69, at 44–5.
57) Ibid., 51 & 62.
58) Oakeshott, Human Conduct, 161.
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the “practices” associated with rules and ruling – the consideration of 
whether traditions should be changed or not.59
Oakeshott’s defĳinition of tradition is not a sociological defĳinition, 
although, like that of Shils, it can be used of any tradition. It is abstract, and, 
like the sociological defĳinition, it is capacious: it excludes nothing. The 
problem with this understanding of tradition is that it overlooks the ten-
sion which Arendt and MacIntyre in very diffferent ways perceive as having 
being the tension of all tensions for over two hundred years, which is the 
tension between the older doctrine of the “image of God” (religion, tradi-
tion and authority) and the modern doctrine of the “works of man” (revolu-
tion, politics and action).60 Many commentators have alleged that one of 
the major weaknesses of Oakeshott’s thought is that it appears to ignore 
the fact that there does seem to be a distinction between the traditions of a 
traditional society and the traditions of a post-revolutionary society. Mod-
ern politics is constituted by a lack of authoritative tradition in many parts 
of the world which have been afffected by revolution.61 Rationalism may 
have been a mistake, but it is an old mistake, and one which – as Arendt 
saw – has its own traditions: so it is too late to consider that identifying that 
mistake can explain how we should act now in a sometimes traditionless 
world. Oakeshott, in saying that tradition is prior to rationality, makes it 
impossible to know what rationality can achieve where there is no obvious 
tradition, or where there are rival traditions.
Oakeshott does not think this is a problem because he defĳines tradition 
in such abstract terms that tradition is whatever we have. But MacIntyre, 
like almost everyone who defĳines tradition more narrowly, and less 
abstractly, does think there is a problem.
59) Cf. the claim, that politics is dependent on “law and custom and tradition”. Michael 
Oakeshott, “The Claims of Politics” in Religion, Politics and the Moral Life ed. Timothy Fuller 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 93.
60) See Edward Craig, The Mind of God and the Works of Man (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987). 
61) “The traditions of most countries no longer provide very illuminating intimations of how 
to cope with daily political reality.” John Dunn, Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the 
Analysis of a Political Phenomenon 1972, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 261. 
“The advice to look to tradition and enhance coherence by pursuing intimations is simply 
meaningless where no worthwhile tradition exists . . . Oakeshott has simply nothing to say 
to people without a tradition to conserve.” Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, “The Roots of Conserva-
tism: Michael Oakeshott and the Denial of Politics”, in The New Conservatives: A Critique 
from the Left ed. Lewis A. Coser and Irving Howe (New Times Book Co., 1974), 262.
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For anyone concerned with ends, it is extremely important to assess 
whether a tradition is the right way to achieve certain ends or not. And 
this means that while Arendt could dismiss or relativize the problem of 
“truth” and Oakeshott could avoid it, MacIntyre is led to consider tradition 
in relation not only to practices (in the plural) but also to truth (in the 
singular).
When MacIntyre is writing about tradition in the abstract he sounds 
remarkably like Oakeshott. He declares as robustly as Oakeshott does in 
After Virtue that any conception of action which ignores “intentions, beliefs 
and settings” is “utterly doomed to failure.”62 He says that “action” is “a 
potentially misleading abstraction”: no more and no less than a “moment” 
in history, which has no meaning outside a practice, a narrative, a tradition 
which brings it into history.63 All action has two conditions: one is that it 
occurs with a frame of unpredictability – this is no diffferent from anything 
said by Oakeshott, or even Arendt; the second is that “action” always has “a 
certain teleological character” because it is framed by some conception of 
the good – this is wholly diffferent. Neither Arendt nor Oakeshott are con-
cerned with ends.64 But for MacIntyre every moment involves an “image of 
some future and an image of the future which always presents itself in the 
form of a telos.”65
MacIntyre agrees with Oakeshott that “action” has to be seen within “tra-
dition”. But while Oakeshott avoids the negative associations of the word 
“tradition”, and used the word “practice” instead, MacIntyre uses both. And 
what we see is that he has a less abstract concept of a practice than Oake-
shott because he defĳines it in terms of its end. He uses the word “practice in 
a specially defĳined way which does not completely agree with current ordi-
nary usage”. By a practice he means
62) MacIntyre, After Virtue, 208.
63) Ibid., 214.
64) This is why for MacIntyre, as a good Aristotelian, politics is inseparable from ethics, 
while for Arendt and Oakeshott politics is always politics. See MacIntyre, “Politics, Philoso-
phy and the Common Good” (1997) in The MacIntyre Reader ed. Kelvin Knight (Note Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 235–52.
65) MacIntyre, After Virtue, 215.
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any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course 
of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, 
and partially defĳinitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended.66
So a practice is neither any sort of activity nor any set of conditions within 
which activity occurs; but a particular sort of activity which involves the 
assumption of the “authority” of “standards of excellence” and a willing 
“obedience to rules” which enable the activity to be judged in relation to 
such standards.67 It is, in short, related to a good. So while Oakeshott calls a 
practice a set of standards, MacIntyre calls a practice an activity carried out 
according to a set of recognized or established or conscious standards. In 
both cases, a practice is, in the end, indistinguishable from tradition. MacIn-
tyre observes, as Oakeshott does, that all practices have a history. “To enter 
into a practice is to enter into a relationship not only with its contemporary 
practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us in the practice”: it 
is, therefore, a “tradition”.68 The diffference is that Oakeshott’s understand-
ing of tradition is capacious, and includes every practice, even an unrea-
sonable one (on the Hegelian assumption that reason is cunning), while 
MacIntyre’s understanding of tradition is one excludes unreasonable theo-
ries or practices. This is because if something is a good, or an end, it requires 
justifĳication.
It is central to the conception of such a tradition that the past is never some-
thing merely to be discarded, but rather that the present is intelligible only as 
a commentary upon and response to the past in which the past, if necessary 
and if possible, is corrected and transcended, yet corrected and transcended 
in a way that leaves the present open to being in turn corrected and tran-
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MacIntyre is ostentatiously hostile to the view of “tradition” taken by Burke 
and other “conservative political theorists.”70 Burke, according to MacIn-
tyre, opposed reason to tradition (much as Arendt does); whereas MacIn-
tyre insists that “all reasoning takes place within the context of some 
traditional mode of thought” (much as Oakeshott does). So “when a tradi-
tion becomes Burkean, it is always dying or dead.”71 His view of tradition is 
that it is “an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an 
argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition.”72 
Since it is an “argument” and only defensible as such, it cannot depend on 
unargued beliefs.
The view of tradition MacIntyre sketches in After Virtue and Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? is very similar to that of Oakeshott. Except in 
these works MacIntyre asks the question Oakeshott did not ask: namely, 
how a tradition can continue to establish itself in a situation where, as 
Arendt might put it, the Roman trinity of religion, tradition and authority 
has been destroyed and there are now only traditions in the plural, each 
of which has its own view “of what rational superiority consists in”.73 
MacIntyre’s answer is something he calls the “rationality of traditions”. 
Since there is no rationality without tradition and no tradition without 
rationality, “we cannot adequately identify either our own commitments or 
those of others in the argumentative conflicts of the present except by situ-
ating them within those histories which made them what they have now 
become.”74 He sketches
three stages in the initial development of a tradition: a fĳirst in which the rele-
vant beliefs, texts and authorities gave not yet been put in question; a second 
in which inadequacies of various types have been identifĳied, but not yet rem-
edied; and a third in which response to those inadequacies has resulted in a 
set of reformulations, revaluations, and new formulations and evaluations, 
designed to remedy inadequacies and overcome limitations.75
70) Ibid., 221.
71) Ibid., 222. MacIntyre returns to the “bastardized” conception of tradition inherited 
from Burke by modern conservatives in MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
(London: Duckworth, 1988), 8, 165 & 353.
72) MacIntyre, After Virtue, 222.
73) MacIntyre, Whose Justice?, 348.
74) Ibid., 13.
75) Ibid., 355.
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This is still fairly abstract: there is nothing in it that Oakeshott, or indeed, 
Arendt, would object to. But in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry he 
puts forward explicitly a view which is only implicit in the other books. This 
is the view that there is, in principle, one unitary tradition which is capable 
of conceptualizing itself rightly as a tradition in a substantive sense and 
opposing itself to other rival ways of understanding existence. And it is at 
this point that MacIntyre entirely parts company with Oakeshott.
For when, in Three Rival Versions, MacIntyre explicitly opposes “tradi-
tion” to “encyclopedia” and “genealogy”, he no longer uses “tradition” as a 
word for any tradition, but (perhaps what it always was) a word for one 
tradition. Each of these three “versions” is associated with a “seminal late-
nineteenth century text: the Ninth Edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der Moral and the encyclical letter of Pope Leo 
XIII Aeterni Patris.”76 Encyclopaedia is a way of seeing the world objec-
tively, in terms of the possibility of rational agreement – which would give 
us a unifĳied science in which one truth can be known under diffferent cat-
egories, a “single neutral nonpartisan history”, and a morality of ethical 
enlightenment.77 Genealogy is a way of seeing the world subjectively, in 
terms of radical disagreement – which would give us no stable science at all 
(since there is “no such thing as truth-as-such, but only truth-from-one-or-
other-point-of-view”), a history of “social and psychological formations in 
which the will to power is distorted into and concealed by the will to truth”, 
and a morality of rancor and resentment.78
Genealogist and encyclopaedist agree in framing what they take to be both 
exclusive and exhaustive alternatives: either reason is thus impersonal, uni-
versal, and disinterested or it is the unwitting representative of particular 
interests, masking their drive to power by its false pretensions to neutrality 
and disinterestedness. What this alternative conceals from view is a third 
possibility.79
76) Ibid., 2.
77) See, especially, ibid., 16–19, 151 & 42.
78) MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (London: Duckworth, 1985), 33, 35–36, 
39 & 41.
79) Ibid., 59.
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Tradition is here a way of seeing the world absolutely, in terms of a canon. 
It involves the view that rational enquiry is only possible within a commu-
nity in which certain values are already recognized and shared – it involves 
“the concept of having to be a certain sort of person, morally or theologi-
cally, in order to read a book aright.”80 This view, unlike genealogy, sup-
poses reason to have content, and, unlike encyclopedia, does not suppose 
that truth is accessible to anyone. It requires a “teacher”. This contradicts 
encyclopaedism, where to be rational is to think for oneself, and genealogy, 
where to follow an authority is to be subject to power and perversion.81 
And it requires a “tradition” which can be taught. For Mac-Intyre, this is, 
interestingly, exactly the same tradition Arendt supposes was destroyed by 
revolution – or, as Popper would have it, rationalism.
MacIntyre is still rationalist enough to think that tradition needs to be 
argued for. But his tradition requires authority, exactly because there is no 
rationality available to all humanity without authority.82 And authority 
requires religion: for while the encyclopaedist attempts to “displace the 
Bible as a canonical book’, in order to establish a new canon, and the gene-
alogist “discredit[s] the whole notion of a canon”, the traditionalist seeks to 
“preserve and justify the canonical status of the Bible as distinct from, yet 
hegemonic over, all secular enquiry”.83 This is the restoration of Arendt’s 
“Roman trinity” of religion, tradition and authority – with (as is crucial for 
MacIntyre) rationality added to make it a quaternity.
All we can notice about this position is that it even though MacIntyre 
appears to make “tradition” less abstract, he does not commit himself 
entirely to the view – what he imagines is Burke’s view – that tradition is 
prior to rationality; so he is in the odd situation of appearing to insist both 
that one “tradition” is prior to rationality and that rationality is prior to tra-
dition. This is the point at which MacIntyre’s thought is fundamentally 
ambivalent. MacIntyre could say, what he does not say, that there are two 
layers of tradition: fĳirstly, the abstract and plural traditions – which Oake-
shott describes – where every action is traditional in the sense that it is 
conditioned by inherited practices, and secondly the determinate and 
singular tradition – which Arendt describes – which is the true type of a 
80) Ibid., 133.
81) Ibid., 64.
82) Ibid., 91 & 99–100.
83) Ibid., 5.
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tradition of which all others are fragments or imitations. It seems at times 
as if he wants to say this, but his own writing oscillates between the claim 
that there is one tradition which is intrinsically authoritative because it 
descends from revelation and the concession that no tradition is likely to 
be able to achieve dominance according to the secular, liberal or rational 
values he himself espouses.84
V
This essay is a contribution to the understanding of tradition in modernity. 
Tradition is far from being a simple, or closed, subject. Here we have at 
least three rival views of tradition. As indicated in the writings of Arendt, 
Oakeshott and MacIntyre, tradition may be nowhere, it may be everywhere, 
or it may be somewhere. There is no defĳinitive view of where tradition is to 
be found. We may suppose that the concept of tradition, for the time being, 
has to oscillate between two extreme conceptions: the fĳirst, that tradition 
originates in eternal truth – whether the logos of Plato or the Gospel of 
John – or it originates in any truth which emerges in time – Nietzsche’s 
“my truth”. Everything else follows from these. If tradition originates in an 
eternal truth, then it must always appeal to this truth in something like 
contemporaneity: through repeated ritual, something like Christian com-
munion, confession or conversion, all of which are moments which repli-
cate the eternal truth represented in the fĳirst instance at the moment of the 
crucifĳixion. If tradition originates in this sort of truth, then it is one. If it is 
right, it is right; if it is wrong, a mistake, then tradition is simply misleading, 
a trick by which various orders have been perpetuated in the service of 
ends extraneous to those professed: ends of power, influence, exploitation 
etc. If this is so, then it is our duty to repudiate tradition and the truth which 
lies behind it. But as everyone has observed, from Popper onwards, the 
paradox of tradition is that even an opposition to tradition becomes a tra-
dition. And this makes possible the expanded, or abstract, or Oakeshottian, 
view of tradition, which is that more or less anything which can be thought 
or done in a sense comes out of continuity, and is conditioned by some sort 
of tradition (and, some would say, by some sort of authority, some sort of 
84) Lewis Hinchman, “Virtue or Autonomy: Alasdair MacIntyre’s Critique of Liberal Indi-
vidualism”, Polity 21 (1989): 635–54.
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religion). In this sense, tradition cannot be wrong: indeed, here, there is 
no distinction between right and wrong, which is why this conception of 
tradition appeals to the sociologists, who want a term which can capture 
everything humans do. But, as long as humans do have a sense of right and 
wrong – which appears to be part of what it is to be human at all – then the 
other conception of tradition will always cast a shadow at the very least, 
and perhaps cast light, on what we say and do.
What we can say about the writers considered in this essay is that each 
has understood this problem in a diffferent way. This is because each has 
diffferent concerns. We could say – since the titles of their books suggest as 
much – that Arendt’s concern is with the human condition, Oakeshott with 
human conduct, and MacIntyre’s with human virtue. Arendt’s concern is 
with the conditions necessary for men and women to achieve the shared 
but relative good of acting together, Oakeshott’s is with the conditions nec-
essary for men and women to achieve their own individual goods, and 
MacIntyre’s is with the conditions necessary for men and women to achieve 
an absolute good. All three are concerned with the good in some form: but 
Arendt’s is a good of action, Oakeshott’s a good of constitution, and MacIn-
tyre’s a good of intention. There is no question that, of the three, Oakeshott 
writes at the highest, or more abstract, level about tradition; but it is part of 
my claim that this is as much a disadvantage as an advantage: because 
when a discussion of tradition becomes abstract – more philosophical and 
less historical (as well as less practical) – it becomes less relevant to our 
actual situation, where only particular or determinate traditions can be rel-
evant. Oakeshott no doubt sees this: the structures of his thought indicate 
that he does; but he nonetheless insists that the philosopher is only con-
cerned with abstraction. Arendt and MacIntyre, with diffferent conse-
quences, do not. They see history and philosophy as infĳinitely tangled. 
Oakeshott would say that Arendt and Mac Intyre were practically rather 
than theoretically concerned with tradition; but Arendt and MacIntyre 
would say that Oakeshott’s distinction between theory and practice 
depends on an arbitrary abstraction from the fact that any theorist himself 
writes out of and any actor acts within a determinate set of traditions.
Arendt understands tradition in terms of beginnings – beginnings which 
interrupt traditions (and start new ones); that Oakeshott understands tra-
ditions in terms of middles – middles which specify neither the origin of 
traditions nor their destination, but legitimate the existence of traditions in 
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general; and that MacIntyre understands tradition in terms of ends – ends 
which justify one tradition above all others. As we have already observed, 
all three of these writers see life, or modern life, as a “predicament.” Arendt 
dislikes tradition and thinks it obscures an adequate response to this pre-
dicament, Oakeshott is indiffferent to any particular tradition but thinks it 
a necessary element in any response to this predicament, and MacIntyre 
seeks the one tradition which he thinks is the only adequate response to 
this predicament.
This comparison makes the weakness of each evident. Arendt is sufffused 
with the pathos of beginnings, and sufffers from imaginative failure when it 
comes to seeing beyond them: so that when she writes about history she 
forces her ideals into history like a set of reproaches, as if men and women 
cannot escape the tradition they have nonetheless left behind. Oakeshott, 
the most systematic, and least prone to exaggeration, is guilty however of 
ironical understatement of difffĳiculty, in supposing that tradition is simply 
whatever we have. We could say he is sufffused with the pathos of middles. 
And MacIntyre, determined to see the furthest, is only prevented from 
committing himself to absolute truth out of a commitment to codes of rea-
son which support the liberalism he remains opposed to. He, alone, empha-
sizes the importance of a telos. So he is sufffused with the pathos of ends. 
But between the three of them, and with requisite seriousness, we have 
perhaps a complete account of what it is possible for us now to think.
The purpose of this essay has been comparative exposition, or, rather, 
exposition of three separate accounts of tradition – considered by this 
author to be three of the most interesting of the last century or so. We can 
say, in conclusion, that Arendt embodies the pure hope of modernity, in 
thinking we can shed tradition and make a new beginning, that Oakeshott, 
less hopeful, observes that we are in a “middle” which is always conditioned 
by tradition, and that MacIntyre reminds us that our traditions can take us 
nowhere without truth. Arendt captures the dawn, Oakeshott the day, and 
MacIntyre the dusk.
